Summary
Does Israeli war rhetoric match reality? Has Israel been protecting Hamas all along? What is the role of Qatar in this dynamic, particularly concerning potential links to Iran/Hezbollah coordination?
This report provides a detailed analysis of the interplay between Israeli military operations in Gaza, Qatari financial aid, and the broader geopolitical landscape involving Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah.
Significant Qatari financial aid, often in cash and with explicit Israeli approval, consistently flowed into Gaza, particularly after major conflicts from 2008 onwards, and extensively from 2014 to 2023. This aid, claimed by Israel to prevent humanitarian collapse and to counter the Palestinian Authority (PA), aligns with the concept of “parapolitics,” where covert or indirect actions yield long-term, ostensibly unintended, consequences.
The historical record indicates Israel’s early, discreet support for Hamas’s precursor to weaken the PLO, a clear manifestation of parapolitics. This policy arguably metastasized as Hamas gained autonomous power beyond its initial intended role. In later years, Israel’s facilitation of Qatari funds was criticized as a “divide and rule” strategy aimed at weakening the PA and preventing a unified Palestinian state, even as Israel engaged Hamas militarily.
While Iran is the primary state sponsor providing direct material and financial support to Hamas and Hezbollah, Qatar’s financial support to the Hamas-run government in Gaza, even if claimed to be for humanitarian purposes, has been criticized for its fungibility, freeing up Hamas resources for military buildup. Qatar’s role as a mediator and host for Hamas leadership is distinct from Iran’s direct military support, but its financial involvement is a critical component of the broader regional dynamic.
The overarching implication is that Israeli policy towards Hamas has been characterized by profound strategic contradictions, oscillating between military confrontation and tacit support. This approach has demonstrably complicated the conflict’s dynamics and fueled the perception that Israel has been “protecting Hamas,” revealing a significant disconnect between stated war rhetoric and underlying strategic realities.
Introduction: Setting the Analytical Framework
The Gaza Strip, a densely populated territory, has long been a flashpoint, particularly since the Hamas Islamic organization assumed control in 2007. Understanding the recurring cycles of violence and the subsequent attempts at de-escalation necessitates a deep dive into the underlying political, economic, and strategic currents that shape this environment. A comprehensive assessment requires examining not only overt military actions but also the intricate web of financial flows and covert political strategies.
This report is prompted by a provocative thesis: “Israeli war rhetoric is far from reality, and Israel has been protecting Hamas all along. Qatar involvement provides the basis for Iran/Hezbollah coordination.” This assertion challenges conventional understandings of the conflict, suggesting a deliberate, albeit contradictory, Israeli policy. This report will rigorously examine this claim through historical evidence and contemporary policy analysis, focusing on the specific Israeli military operations, and the nature of Qatari financial involvement in their aftermath.
To address these claims, we will first define and apply the concept of “parapolitics” to Israel’s historical and ongoing engagement with Arab and Islamic factions, particularly Hamas. We will then proceed with a chronological review of specified Israeli military operations in Gaza, meticulously assessing the extent and nature of Qatari financial involvement in their immediate aftermath and as part of broader policy. Finally, we will analyze the regional nexus involving Iran, Hezbollah, and Qatar, synthesizing these diverse elements to provide an evidence-based, nuanced assessment of Israeli policy and rhetoric. The analysis will allow the evidence to guide our conclusions.
“Parapolitics” and its Application to Israel-Hamas Relations
The analytical framework for this report hinges on the concept of “parapolitics,” which sheds light on the often-unforeseen consequences of indirect state actions.
Covert operations, when they generate or reinforce autonomous political power, almost always outlast the specific purpose for which they were designed. Instead, they enlarge and become part of the hostile forces the country has to contend with. To put it in more precise terms, parapolitics, the exercise of power by covert means, tends to metastasize into deep politics, an interplay of unacknowledged forces over which the original parapolitical agent no longer has control.
This definition is crucial for understanding how initially-controlled covert actions can evolve into uncontrollable, self-sustaining forces that ultimately challenge the orchestrating power. The trajectory of Israel’s relationship with Hamas provides a compelling case study for this phenomenon.
Historical Background: Israeli Support for Early Islamist Movements
Prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, Israel consistently refused to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as “the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” In this context, Israel actively sought alternative bodies to engage with, aiming to circumvent PLO influence and manage the conflict on its own terms. This strategic posture laid the groundwork for engagement with non-PLO actors.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Israeli officials deliberately encouraged and supported Islamist politician Ahmed Yassin, a prominent figure within the Muslim Brotherhood, who was establishing a network of mosques, clubs, and schools in Gaza. Israel granted licenses and provided direct support to Yassin to build and expand this network. This constituted a direct facilitation of an Islamist movement, seemingly as a counterweight to the secular PLO. Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, who served as the Israeli military governor in Gaza during the early 1980s, openly admitted to providing financial assistance to Mujama al-Islamiya, which was the precursor of Hamas, explicitly stating that this was done “on the instruction of the Israeli authorities.” This is a critical piece of evidence directly linking Israeli authorities to the financial support of Hamas’s progenitor.
Reports from the time indicate that when Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza, they were presented as primarily focused on religious study rather than confrontation. Israel officially recognized Mujama Al-Islamiya as a charity, further legitimizing and enabling its activities. This highlights Israel’s initial presentation of these groups as a “less threatening alternative” to the PLO. Crucially, Israel often remained neutral when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals, such as Fatah (a core faction of the PLO), clashed, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and Judea and Samaria. This strategic neutrality effectively allowed the Hamas Islamic movement to consolidate power and expand its influence against its secular rivals, thereby achieving the strategic objective of weakening the PLO.
However, this policy of indirect support ultimately led to predictable consequences. After the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, Yassin’s network reorganized itself into an armed organization, Hamas, issuing a genocidal founding charter in 1988. Despite this shift, the Israeli government reportedly continued to encourage Hamas’s growth until the group carried out its first attacks in the spring of 1989. This historical trajectory illustrates a profound strategic contradiction. The initial strategic aim was to weaken the PLO by fostering an alternative, seemingly less threatening, Islamist force. However, the agent (Hamas) developed its own autonomous power and became a formidable, hostile force, precisely as the concept of parapolitics suggests. The initial purpose was achieved, but the long-term outcome was the emergence of a significant and enduring adversary, demonstrating how covert actions can lead to detrimental blowback.
Contemporary Background: Facilitation of Qatari Aid to Hamas
The historical precedent of fostering internal Palestinian divisions finds a contemporary echo in Israel’s policy of facilitating Qatari aid to Hamas, particularly in recent years. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated in a 2023 interview that “In the last 15 years, Israel did everything to downgrade the Palestinian Authority and to boost Hamas.” He further elaborated that when Gaza was on the brink of collapse due to lack of resources and the PA’s refusal to provide funds, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “saved them” by making a deal with Qatar to transfer “millions and millions of dollars to Gaza”. This provides a high-level political endorsement of the “boosting Hamas” claim.
Perhaps most significantly, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself was reportedly quoted in 2019 stating: “Anyone who wants to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state needs to support strengthening Hamas”. This direct statement strongly aligns with a clear strategic rationale for empowering Hamas. Indeed, from 2018 to 2023, Israel’s government explicitly enabled and approved Qatari support for Hamas for “political reasons,” specifically “in the hope that it would turn Hamas into an effective counterweight to the Palestinian Authority and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state”. This clearly articulates the strategic intent behind facilitating Qatari funds.
Further supporting this perspective, a probe by Israel’s Shin Bet security agency cited Israel’s years-long policy of facilitating payments by Qatar to Hamas-ruled Gaza (between 2018 and 2021) for cash payment of Hamas employees’ salaries and large amounts of cash to families in need, as a factor in Hamas’s force buildup. The Shin Bet summary specifically named “the flow of money from Qatar to Gaza and its delivery to Hamas’s military wing” as one of the contributing factors. This is a direct internal Israeli intelligence assessment supporting the link between Qatari funds and Hamas’s military capabilities, despite Qatar’s insistence that “no aid has ever been delivered to Hamas’s political or military wing” and that all aid was provided with the “full knowledge, support and supervision of the current and previous Israeli administrations and their security agencies—including the Shin Bet”.
The consistent strategic thread in Israeli policy, albeit with evolving tactics, is evident. The shift from direct financial support to a precursor group to facilitating Qatari funds for Hamas demonstrates a continuity in the “divide and rule” objective. This creates a profound paradox: Israel engaging Hamas militarily while simultaneously enabling its financial sustenance to prevent PA rule. This suggests that the “war rhetoric” might indeed be “far from reality,” not necessarily because Israel wants Hamas to win, but because its strategic objectives (preventing a Palestinian state) have led to policies that indirectly strengthen Hamas’s hold on Gaza, despite the military confrontations. This complex interplay of conflicting short-term tactical needs (stability in Gaza, avoiding humanitarian crisis) and long-term strategic goals (preventing PA statehood) represents a modern iteration of the parapolitics concept. The policy, intended to prevent a Palestinian state by weakening the PA, ironically strengthened Hamas to a degree that led to the very conflict Israel sought to contain, thereby demonstrating the “metastasis” of parapolitics into “deep politics,” where control is lost.
Israeli Military Operations in Gaza (1996-present) and Post-Conflict Qatari Financial Aid: A Chronological Review
This section provides a summary of key Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, detailing the specific conditions that led to its initiation, including the nature and frequency of attacks from Gaza, the resulting Israeli casualties (lives claimed and wounded), and documented property damage. We also examine responses by local Israeli leaders regarding the eventual ceasefire arrangements, offering an authentic perspective on the impact of these conflicts.
Operation Rainbow (May 2004)
Operation Rainbow, initiated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in May 2004, involved an invasion and siege of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. The immediate catalyst for this operation was the severe loss of Israeli military personnel. On May 11 and 12, two M-113 armored personnel carriers were destroyed by Palestinian militants in separate incidents in Gaza City’s Zeitoun neighborhood and along the Philadelphi Route near Rafah, resulting in the deaths of 11 IDF soldiers. This escalation prompted the Israeli government to approve a plan on May 13 to expand the Philadelphi Route by demolishing “dozens or perhaps hundreds” of homes. The broader context of the period included ongoing Palestinian rocket attacks, with over 281 such incidents recorded in 2004.
During Operation Rainbow, 13 Israeli soldiers were killed.
Operation Days of Penitence (September-October 2004)
Operation Days of Penitence was launched by Israel in late September 2004, primarily targeting the northern Gaza Strip. Its stated objective was to push Gaza missiles out of range of Israeli towns in the western Negev, particularly Sderot. The operation was a direct response to a surge in shelling attacks. On September 29, 2004, a Qassam rocket attack by Hamas on Sderot killed two Israeli children, aged 3 and 5. Hamas claimed this attack was in retaliation for an Israeli raid in the Jabalia refugee camp that resulted in the deaths of four Muslims. The broader context of 2004 saw over 281 rocket attacks on Israel.
During the 18-day operation, five Israelis were killed, a figure that includes the two children killed in Sderot by the preceding rocket attack. At least two Israeli soldiers were reported injured. While specific figures for Israeli property damage are not available, rocket attacks generally caused widespread fear and hardship in Israeli border communities, and did cause property damage.
The civilian toll in Sderot served as a primary driver for this operation and fueled strong reactions from local leaders. Sderot Mayor Alon Davidi, in later statements (May 2021), articulated a consistent sentiment among leaders in rocket-affected towns. He expressed profound dissatisfaction with ceasefires, stating, “I don’t understand why we’re having a ceasefire, there is no reason for a ceasefire.” He criticized the government for not pursuing a decisive victory against Hamas, arguing that limiting responses to airstrikes and artillery would not “restore normal life”. This reveals a recurring pattern of local leadership advocating for more aggressive military solutions when temporary truces do not bring lasting security.
Operation Summer Rains (June-November 2006)
Operation Summer Rains, launched on June 28, 2006, marked Israel’s first major ground operation in the Gaza Strip since its unilateral disengagement in 2005. The operation was triggered by the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants, three days after an attack on an IDF observation post at Kerem Shalom. This event occurred against a backdrop of escalating violence, with 757 missiles having been fired from Gaza into Israel between the 2005 disengagement and the end of June 2006.
During Operation Summer Rains, 11 Israelis were killed, including 5 soldiers and 6 civilians. Additionally, 38 soldiers and 44 civilians were injured, with 11 injuries attributed to homemade rockets.
The operation concluded with a ceasefire agreement signed on November 26, 2006. Despite the cessation of hostilities, Gilad Shalit was not released at this time.
Operation Autumn Clouds (November 2006)
Operation Autumn Clouds, launched on November 1, 2006, served as a follow-up to Operation Summer Rains, with the primary aim of stopping Gazan rocket attacks into Israel. This operation was initiated in response to numerous rocket and mortar attacks on southern Israel. Between the 2005 disengagement and November 9, 2006, approximately 1,700 Qassam rockets had been fired into Israel by Gaza’s Islamic organizations, resulting in 41 Israeli injuries.
During the operation, one Israeli soldier was killed. Three Israeli civilians were wounded, and eight Israelis were injured by rocket fire during the two weeks following the operation’s start. The broader context of rocket attacks during this period indicates a persistent threat to Israeli communities.
The operation officially ended on November 8, 2006, with Israeli troops beginning to withdraw from Beit Hanoun. A ceasefire agreement was subsequently signed on November 26, 2006. Rocket fire from Gaza continued, even after major military interventions.
Operation Hot Winter (February-March 2008)
Operation Hot Winter was launched by the IDF on February 28, 2008, in response to Qassam rockets fired from the Gaza Strip onto Israeli civilians. The immediate trigger included a February 27 incident where Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired six Grad missiles at Ashkelon, causing light injuries. This period also saw Palestinian militant groups smuggling longer-range missiles, such as Katyushas and Grads, into the Strip following a breach of the Gaza-Egypt border. On March 1, 2008, 117 rockets were fired from Gaza at southern Israel, with 26 on that day alone, extending as far north as Ashkelon.
During the four-day operation, three Israelis were killed (one civilian and two soldiers). More than seven Israelis were injured, including five civilians in Ashkelon, and a much larger number of civilians were wounded or treated for shock due to the rocket attacks. The rocket attacks caused widespread fear and hardship in Israeli border communities and resulted in millions of dollars’ worth of property damage, including schools. Heavy property damage was also reported more generally.
Following the operation, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s office announced on March 5, 2008, that Israel would maintain pressure on Hamas, though he left the door open for an unofficial truce. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas temporarily suspended contacts with Israel, citing “Israeli aggression”.
Reactions from Israeli local leaders revealed a strong desire for decisive action. Sderot Mayor Alon Davidi, in later statements (August 2018), called any truce a “mistake” and urged a military operation to “eradicate this terror”. Tamir Idan, head of the Sdot Negev Regional Council, echoed this, calling a ceasefire a “serious mistake” that allowed Hamas to control the fire. Leaders of Moshav Netiv Ha’asara adjacent to the border described the ceasefire as “simply an embarrassment”. This consistent stance from affected communities underscores the significant domestic pressure on Israeli governments to achieve long-term security rather than temporary calm.
Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009)
Operation Cast Lead, launched on December 27, 2008, and lasting 22 days, represented a major Israeli military offensive in the Gaza Strip. The operation followed the unraveling of a six-month temporary ceasefire (tahdiya) between Israel and Hamas. While Hamas claimed it did not order them, random mortar and rocket fire from Gaza continued after the June 2008 ceasefire. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that the operation was a “last resort” after other attempts to bring quiet to southern communities failed, emphasizing eight years of “unceasing targets of brutal, deliberate and planned rocket fire” on Israeli civilians.
During Operation Cast Lead, 13 Israelis were killed, including 3 civilians and 10 soldiers (four of whom died in a “friendly fire” incident). An estimated 180 Israelis were injured by rockets and mortars, with other reports indicating 336 soldiers and 182 civilians wounded. The operation caused massive disruption in Israel, with approximately 800,000 people within rocket range, leading to the closure of public schools and universities in the southern part of the country.
Upon the ceasefire, Prime Minister Olmert announced on January 17, 2009, that Israel would cease its actions against “terror organizations” but would remain deployed in the Gaza Strip and its environs. The mayor of Sderot, in later comments (May 2021), harshly denounced the “unconditional ceasefire,” asserting that Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli government were not interested in defeating Hamas and preferred temporary quiet for central Israel. This highlights the ongoing tension between the strategic objectives of the Israeli government and the security demands of its border communities.
Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012)
Operation Pillar of Defense was an eight-day campaign launched by the IDF on November 14, 2012, with the stated objective of reducing rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. The operation commenced with the targeted elimination of Ahmed Jabari, the acting chief of Hamas’s armed wing. This action followed weeks of escalating violent incidents along the Gaza-Israel border, including over 100 rockets launched at Israel within a 24-hour period, an attack on an Israeli military patrol jeep, and an explosion caused by improvised explosive devices. Since October 2012, there had been four rounds of intensified violence involving Gaza rocket fire and incursions into Israel.
During the operation, Islamic groups fired over 1,500 rockets at Israel. Of these, 1,667 rockets were launched, with 436 intercepted by the Iron Dome air defense system. Approximately 875 rockets landed in vacant areas, 58 hit populated areas, and 421 were intercepted. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 6 Israelis (4 civilians and 2 soldiers) and injured 240, including 14 Israelis and foreign nationals.
The ceasefire, mediated by Egypt, was announced on November 21, 2012. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared the operation successful and thanked US President Obama for his support. However, local reactions in Israel were mixed. Residents of Kiryat Malachi, where three people were killed by a Gaza rocket, denounced the truce, with some protesters displaying banners condemning “agreements with terrorists.” Sderot Mayor Alon Davidi, while supporting the operation, expressed skepticism about long-term peace, stating that if Netanyahu stopped then, he would be “making a mistake”. This demonstrates the persistent tension between the government’s declared objectives of deterrence and the public’s desire for an end to rocket fire and a return to normalcy.
Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014)
Operation Protective Edge was launched by Israel on July 8, 2014, in response to intensified rocket fire from Hamas in Gaza. This operation was preceded by significant escalations, including the kidnappings and murders of three Israeli teenagers, which led to heightened tensions and increased rocket attacks. The discovery of tunnels in March 2014 and the explosion of an alleged tunnel exit on July 8 further contributed to the decision to launch the operation.
During the 50-day conflict, Islamic groups fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 71 Israelis, including 66 soldiers and 5 civilians (one of whom was a child). Up to 1,600 Israelis were injured, including 270 children. Direct damage to civilian property in Israel amounted to almost $25 million, with rockets striking apartment buildings, schools, houses, cars, and power lines.
Throughout the conflict, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu consistently claimed that Israel would not negotiate under fire and that the operation would continue until quiet was restored for a long period. Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon echoed this, stating, “Operation Protective Edge is not over”. Local leaders in affected Israeli communities expressed strong dissatisfaction with the ceasefire. Sderot Mayor Alon Davidi criticized the ceasefire, advocating for a ground invasion to “eradicate Hamas” and arguing that the achievements of the operation had been exhausted. Ashkelon Mayor Itmar Shimoni took controversial measures, barring Israeli-Arab construction workers from building bomb shelters in his city, citing security concerns, a decision criticized by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni. These reactions underscore the deep frustration within border communities regarding the cyclical nature of the conflict and the inadequacy of temporary ceasefires.
Additional Israeli Military Operations in Gaza (2021-Present)
Since Operation Protective Edge in 2014, the Gaza Strip has remained a volatile flashpoint, experiencing several significant Israeli military operations. Each of these interventions was precipitated by escalating tensions and cross-border attacks, leading to substantial impacts on the Israeli population.
Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 10-21, 2021)
This operation was initiated following a significant escalation of tensions in Jerusalem, particularly stemming from Israeli police actions on the Temple Mount compound during Ramadan and the impending eviction of Muslim families from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. In response to these events, Hamas launched rocket fire towards Jerusalem on May 10, 2021, marking a critical escalation. Over the 11-day duration of Operation Guardian of the Walls, more than 4,360 Palestinian rockets were fired towards Israel, with approximately 3,573 impacting Israeli territory. While Israel’s Iron Dome defense system intercepted about 90% of those heading for populated areas, several hundred rockets also landed within Gaza or in the sea. Beyond rockets, incendiary balloons and kites from Gaza had also been a recurring form of attack in the years leading up to this operation, causing fires in Israeli agricultural lands and nature reserves.
The human cost on the Israeli side included 13 fatalities from rocket fire, comprising two children, one Indian woman, two Thai men working in Israel, and an IDF soldier killed by an anti-tank missile. Concurrently, two Jewish-Israelis were also killed in riots that erupted in Lod and Acre. Medical services treated 114 injuries directly attributable to rocket attacks and an additional 198 indirectly related, such as those sustained while seeking shelter. Property damage in Israel was widespread, affecting homes, schools, industrial facilities, commercial establishments, and agricultural areas. Notably, an IDF strike targeted a branch of the Islamic National Bank, which was identified as a “terrorist vault for Hamas,” handling funding for rocket production and the organization’s daily cash flow, underscoring a direct hit on Hamas’s financial infrastructure.
Upon the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire on May 21, 2021, both Israeli and Gaza Islamic groups stated their adherence. The sentiment from southern Israeli communities, after years of cycles of violence, reflected a persistent desire for more decisive action to ensure lasting security. Conversely, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) spokesmen publicly celebrated what they termed their “victory,” emphasizing their actions as a defense of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. In the immediate aftermath, Egypt assumed a prominent role in coordinating reconstruction aid for Gaza, aiming to limit the influence of other international actors and utilizing Egyptian army-affiliated companies for transfers. This suggested a diversification in post-conflict aid mechanisms compared to the direct Qatari cash transfers observed previously, though Qatar maintained its broader role as a mediator and provider of humanitarian assistance to Gaza.
Operation Breaking Dawn (August 5-7, 2022)
Operation Breaking Dawn marked a shift in Israeli military strategy, primarily constituting a preemptive strike against Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). This intervention was triggered by what Israel described as an “immediate threat” of retaliation from PIJ following the arrest of Bassem al-Saadi, a senior PIJ leader in Jenin in Samaria, on August 1. In the wake of al-Saadi’s arrest, PIJ issued explicit statements threatening retaliation, prompting Israel to implement a partial lockdown in communities near the Gaza border, including road and railway closures, to protect its civilians. Unlike previous large-scale operations that were direct responses to massive rocket barrages, this was largely a pre-emptive measure by Israel, though PIJ did launch rockets after the initial Israeli strikes. During the 66-hour operation, PIJ and other groups fired approximately 1,100 rockets towards Israel. Of these, about 990 crossed into Israeli territory, while roughly 200 landed within the Gaza Strip. The Iron Dome system intercepted around 380 rockets, claiming a 96% success rate for those entering populated areas.
While no Israeli deaths were reported during Operation Breaking Dawn, 31 Israelis received hospital treatment for injuries, primarily from shrapnel or those sustained while rushing to shelters, alongside two IDF soldiers and one civilian who were lightly wounded by shrapnel. Due to the high interception rate and the fact that most rockets landed in open areas, specific overall monetary figures for Israeli property damage are not widely reported for this relatively short operation.
The Egyptian-mediated ceasefire came into effect on August 7, 2022. Then-Prime Minister Yair Lapid hailed the operation as a success, asserting that it achieved its goals of weakening PIJ and restoring deterrence.
October 7, 2023 – Present
The current Gaza operation commenced with an unprecedented, large-scale, and coordinated Hamas-led attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, serving as the immediate and overwhelming catalyst for the ongoing conflict. This devastating assault involved thousands of Hamas and other fighters breaching Israel’s heavily fortified border fence at numerous points, infiltrating Israeli communities, military bases, and an outdoor music festival. The ground invasion was accompanied by a massive barrage of at least 2,200 rockets launched into Israel within just 20 minutes, a volume that overwhelmed the Iron Dome system in certain areas. The comprehensive nature of the assault, involving land, sea, and air infiltration, specifically targeted civilians in their homes and at a music festival, alongside military installations.
The human toll on the Israeli side was catastrophic, with over 1,200 people killed during the initial October 7 attacks, predominantly civilians (estimated 815), including women, children, and foreign nationals. Since October 7, 2023, over 13,500 Israeli civilians and soldiers have been wounded, and 251 individuals were taken hostage into Gaza by Hamas and other groups. The property damage inflicted upon Israeli communities bordering Gaza, known as the “Gaza Envelope,” has been extensive and catastrophic. Entire kibbutzim and towns were ravaged, with homes burned, infrastructure destroyed, and widespread devastation, resulting in estimated damages in the billions of dollars, an unprecedented scale in recent Israeli history.
As of June 2025, a comprehensive, lasting ceasefire to end the conflict has not been achieved. While a temporary ceasefire in November 2023 facilitated a hostage exchange, and a second, brief ceasefire in January 2025 quickly broke down, negotiations continue. Reactions from Israeli leaders and affected communities to these temporary truces have been varied. There is a strong and pervasive demand for the return of all hostages, coupled with a widespread sentiment, particularly from many residents in the south, that the war must continue until Hamas is completely dismantled and deterrence is fully restored. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has consistently claimed that the war will not conclude until Hamas is destroyed as a military and governing power and all hostages are returned. Displaced residents of southern Israel, deeply traumatized by the October 7 attacks, express a strong demand for security and a fundamental change in the situation in Gaza to enable their safe return.
Qatar has continued to play a central role as a mediator in ceasefire and hostage release negotiations throughout the current war. Its unique channels with Hamas, partly stemming from its historical financial relationship and its role in hosting Hamas leaders, have made it an indispensable actor in these diplomatic efforts. However, the context of Qatari money has fundamentally shifted since October 7. The previous arrangement of direct cash transfers from Qatar to Gaza with explicit Israeli approval has ceased. Qatar’s financial involvement is now primarily channeled through humanitarian aid organizations, which operate under intense scrutiny and frequently face blockades or limitations imposed by Israel due to the ongoing conflict and Israeli claims of Hamas diverting aid. The controversy surrounding Qatar’s past financial aid to Hamas has intensified significantly since October 7, with many in Israel and internationally directly linking it to Hamas’s ability to wage war. Qatar has faced increased pressure and criticism regarding its ties to Hamas, with some Israeli officials advocating for its role as a mediator to be diminished or even terminated. Qatar, for its part, continues to assert its commitment to humanitarian aid and its mediating role. The flow of Qatari funds to Gaza remains a contentious and pivotal element in the current geopolitical discussions, but the mechanism of “valises full of millions” with Israeli approval is no longer active in the same pre-October 7 manner.
The consistent pattern of Gaza attacks, primarily rocket fire, has inflicted a significant toll on Israeli civilians and property, serving as a primary driver for military interventions. The responses from Israeli mayors and leaders in affected border communities consistently reflect a deep-seated frustration with temporary ceasefires. These local voices frequently advocate for more decisive military action, including ground operations, to “eradicate” militant threats and ensure long-term security, rather than merely achieving intermittent calm. This recurring sentiment highlights the strong domestic political pressure on Israeli governments to pursue more comprehensive solutions, even if they entail greater military escalation.
How many of these operations ended with a “valise full of millions” from Qatar to Gaza? Direct and explicit evidence of Qatari cash transfers, with Israeli approval, is most clearly and extensively documented for Operation Protective Edge (2014) and the subsequent period (2018-2021). For Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009) and Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), there were significant Qatari pledges and high-level visits for reconstruction and support, indicating substantial financial involvement post-conflict, though the specific “valise” cash delivery method is not detailed for these earlier periods. For Operation Summer Rains (2006), Qatar provided medical aid during the operation.
This highlights a critical strategic blind spot or calculated risk taken by Israel: believing it could control the use of funds even when delivered in cash, which is inherently difficult to track. The Israeli policy reveals a strategic dilemma: balancing immediate concerns and the desire for short-term calm with long-term security objectives. This often leads to paradoxical outcomes where efforts to manage a situation inadvertently empower an adversary. The debate over the “fungibility” of aid is central to understanding the considerations involved. Israel’s explicit approval and facilitation of Qatari funds, whether for humanitarian or political reasons, directly enabled the Hamas administration to maintain control and financial stability in Gaza. This financial backing, regardless of its stated purpose, could have indirectly allowed Hamas to allocate its own internally generated funds or other external support towards military buildup and operations. This policy, intended to manage the conflict, is now being scrutinized as a significant contributing factor to its escalation, particularly the October 7, 2023 attacks. The “divide and rule” strategy, while seemingly pragmatic in the short term, can have severe long-term blowback, reinforcing the parapolitics concept by creating and empowering forces that eventually become uncontrollable threats.
Qatar has emerged as a pivotal financial supporter and mediator in the Gaza Strip. Its involvement extends beyond mere humanitarian assistance, encompassing significant financial transfers and diplomatic mediation efforts.
Overview of Qatar’s Role as a Financial Supporter and Mediator in Gaza
Qatar has been identified as a key financial supporter of the Hamas Islamic organization, transferring more than $1.8 billion to them over the years. This substantial financial commitment includes a reported consistent monthly transfer of $30 million between 2018 and 2023, often conducted “in consultation with the U.S. and Israeli governments”. This highlights Qatar’s significant financial leverage and its engagement with international actors regarding these transfers.
Beyond financial aid, Qatar has played a significant political role by hosting Hamas’s political office and leadership in Doha since 2012. This arrangement has allowed for direct communication channels with Hamas, making Qatar a crucial point of contact for international diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, Qatar has successfully positioned itself as a crucial mediator in ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas, particularly in recent conflicts, leveraging its unique ties to both sides to facilitate negotiations. This multi-faceted involvement allows Qatar significant leverage but also draws criticism, particularly regarding its neutrality.
Mechanisms and Purposes of Qatari Aid
The nature and delivery mechanisms of Qatari aid to Gaza are central to understanding its impact. Officially, Qatari aid has been described as humanitarian, providing essential supplies such as food and medicine, electricity provision, and support for reconstruction projects. A significant portion of the funds involved cash payments for Hamas employees’ salaries and direct cash transfers to needy families. The imagery of a “valise full of millions” is directly supported by evidence: Qatari diplomat Mohammad al-Emadi personally oversaw the deliveries of “hundreds of millions of dollars in cash” from Qatar to Gaza between 2018 and 2021. These convoys were reportedly flown from Ben Gurion Airport to Gaza, and al-Emadi was “present when the funds were handed over to Hamas officials”. This explicitly confirms the direct cash transfers to Hamas-controlled entities.
The delivery mechanisms were often coordinated with international bodies; for instance, Qatari-funded fuel was coordinated with the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and transferred through the Kerem Shalom commercial crossing, which is Israel’s only designated crossing for goods into Gaza. Aid to families was coordinated with the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) and transferred to the World Food Program. Qatar consistently maintains that its aid is purely humanitarian and that “no aid has ever been delivered to Hamas’s political or military wing.”
Israeli Policy Regarding Qatari Funds: Rationale and Criticisms
Israel’s policy regarding Qatari funds has been a subject of intense debate and criticism. Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly stated that his government allowed Qatari money to flow into Gaza to avoid a “civilian humanitarian collapse—disease, rampant hunger and other things that would have created an impossible humanitarian situation.” This rationale emphasizes the humanitarian imperative and the need to maintain stability in Gaza.
However, as discussed, another primary rationale, articulated by critics and even by Netanyahu himself in other contexts, was to prevent the establishment of a unified Palestinian state by propping up Hamas in Gaza as a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria. A report in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper alleged that Netanyahu initiated Qatari payments after thwarting a Saudi initiative to rebuild Gaza (post-2014 war) that would have replaced Hamas with the PA. This suggests a preference for Hamas rule over PA governance in Gaza.
Critics argue that the policy of allowing Qatari funds was a “risky game of ‘divide-and-rule'” that ultimately strengthened Hamas. The principle of “fungibility of money” is a key concern: even if aid was ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, by covering civilian expenses, it could free up Hamas’s own resources (e.g., from taxing imports) for military purposes. A confidential report in April 2024 by a team of veteran U.S. and Israeli intelligence professionals found that “Qatari funding and policies led directly to October 7th, indicating a direct causal link perceived by some intelligence analysts. The Shin Bet probe also cited Israel’s years-long policy of facilitating Qatari payments to Hamas-ruled Gaza as a factor in Hamas’s force buildup. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett reportedly stopped these payments during his brief tenure (2021-2022), but Netanyahu reversed this decision upon his return to office.
The Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas Axis and Qatar’s Role
The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is characterized by a complex web of alliances and rivalries, with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas forming a significant “resistance axis” against Israel. Understanding Qatar’s role requires differentiating its involvement from Iran’s direct material support to this axis.
Iran’s Long-Standing Support for Hamas and Hezbollah
Iran has been a consistent and long-standing patron of both Hamas and Hezbollah, providing substantial material and financial support for decades. Iran is identified as one of Hamas’s biggest benefactors, contributing funds, weapons, and training. Estimates from the U.S. State Department in 2021 indicate that Iran provides approximately $100 million annually to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other Palestinian groups designated as terrorist organizations. This highlights the scale and nature of Iran’s direct military-enabling support to these groups. Western and Middle Eastern intelligence officials widely accuse Iran of providing training, money, and other assistance to Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip, reinforcing the consensus on Iran’s direct role in bolstering their capabilities.
Hezbollah, a key proxy, was created shortly after the Iranian revolution to help export its ideology and project Iranian power in the region. This establishes the foundational link between Iran and its regional proxies, indicating a strategic depth to their relationship.
Analysis of Alleged Coordination Between Hamas and Hezbollah
Analysts frequently observe that fighting with Israel signals coordination between Hamas and Hezbollah. This suggests a strategic alignment and shared objectives rather than merely opportunistic or independent actions. Lina Khatib, director of the SOAS Middle East Institute, explicitly states that Hezbollah (a Shia Muslim organization) and Hamas (a Sunni group) have coordinated for years, despite their sectarian differences. This challenges a common misconception that sectarian divides inherently prevent cooperation, demonstrating a pragmatic alliance forged by shared strategic goals.
Both Hamas and Hezbollah are reported to receive financial, military, and rhetorical support from Iran. This shared patronage from Iran is a key facilitating factor for their coordination, fostering a sense of collective purpose and mutual reliance. Israeli intelligence analysts refer to the relationship among Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran as “the resistance camp,” emphasizing their shared goal of weakening Israel and establishing a Muslim-run land from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. This highlights a unified strategic objective that underpins their coordinated actions. While Northeastern University associate professor Max Abrahms notes that Iran’s influence over both Hamas and Hezbollah varies, with Hamas operating with more autonomy than Hezbollah, Hamas has “managed to impress its Iranian backers—and Hezbollah” since 2021, suggesting increased recognition of Hamas’s capabilities within the axis. This indicates a dynamic and evolving relationship within the broader “resistance camp.”
The formation of this “resistance axis” or “resistance camp” with shared ideological and strategic goals, despite tactical or sectarian differences, is a significant theme. This indicates a more integrated, albeit varying, level of cooperation than mere opportunistic alignment, driven by a common adversary and shared patronage. Iran’s consistent patronage, shared anti-Israel objectives, and strategic guidance foster coordination and mutual support between Hamas and Hezbollah. This enhances their collective capabilities and regional impact, allowing for multi-front pressure on Israel. This axis poses a multi-front, complex threat to Israel’s security and significantly complicates regional stability. The interconnectedness of these groups underscores that conflicts in one area can have ripple effects across the region, making a comprehensive understanding of their relationships crucial for effective policy.
Qatar’s Distinct Role as a Host and Mediator, Differentiating from Iran’s Direct Material Support
Qatar’s role in the Gaza context is distinct from Iran’s direct military support to the “resistance axis.” Qatar plays a unique and often contradictory role as both a significant financial patron to the Hamas-run government and a crucial diplomatic mediator. Qatar hosts the Hamas political office and provides substantial financial resources to the Hamas-run government, “though with the knowledge and cooperation of the Israeli government.” This highlights Qatar’s unique position as both a financial patron and a state with established channels to Israel.
Qatar has transferred over $1.8 billion to Hamas-run Gaza, including a reported $30 million monthly between 2018 and 2023, often in consultation with the U.S. and Israeli governments. This substantial financial commitment underscores its influence. Qatar consistently insists that “no aid has ever been delivered to Hamas’s political or military wing,” stating its support is purely humanitarian for families, electricity, food, and medicine, and that all aid was provided with full Israeli knowledge and supervision. This is Qatar’s official defense against accusations of funding terrorism. Despite criticisms regarding its neutrality, Qatar has successfully positioned itself as the lead negotiator in the Hamas-Israel war , leveraging its unique ties to both sides to facilitate negotiations.
Qatar’s financial support, even if categorized as humanitarian, directly underpins the Hamas administration’s ability to govern and provide services. This, in turn, potentially frees up Hamas’s own funds for other activities, including military ones. This financial stability, combined with Qatar’s hosting of Hamas leadership, contributes to Hamas’s resilience and operational capacity. However, Qatar’s role is distinct from Iran’s direct military provisioning and training; Iran is the primary military backer, while Qatar supports the governing apparatus.
The question of whether Qatar provides a basis for Iran/Hezbollah coordination is not directly supported as a causal link. Iran is explicitly identified as the primary link for coordination between Hamas and Hezbollah. Instead, Qatar’s financial support to Hamas enables Hamas as a governing entity. This enabled Hamas, in turn, coordinates with Iran and Hezbollah as part of the “resistance camp.” Therefore, Qatar’s involvement is an indirect enabling factor rather than a direct “basis for coordination.” The fungibility of funds is the critical point here, as it allows Hamas to maintain its civilian functions while potentially diverting other resources to military ends, thereby sustaining its role within the Iran-led axis.
Analysis: “Protecting Hamas” Versus War Rhetoric
The assertion that “Israeli war rhetoric is far from reality, and that Israel has been protecting Hamas all along” warrants a comprehensive analysis, integrating the historical context of “parapolitics” with the contemporary dynamics of Qatari financial aid:
Synthesis of Findings on Historical Israeli Policy (Parapolitics) and the Facilitation of Qatari Aid
The historical evidence strongly supports the “parapolitics” thesis. Israel’s initial support for Islamist groups in Gaza in the 1970s and 80s was a calculated move to weaken the PLO. This covert action, intended for a specific political purpose, arguably “metastasized” into the emergence of Hamas as a powerful, autonomous entity that later became a primary adversary. This historical trajectory reveals a significant strategic miscalculation. Israel’s initial goal was to weaken the PLO’s influence by supporting an alternative, seemingly less threatening, Islamist movement in Gaza. The mechanism involved providing licenses, support, and financial assistance to Mujama al-Islamiya, the precursor to Hamas, and maintaining neutrality during Islamist-PLO clashes. The outcome was the emergence of Hamas as an armed organization, gaining significant power and control.
This pattern continued in a different form with the facilitation of Qatari aid. While Prime Minister Netanyahu claimed humanitarian motives for allowing these funds , his own statements and those of former officials , alongside Israeli intelligence reports, suggest a strategic aim to prevent a unified Palestinian state by propping up Hamas in Gaza as a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria. The later Israeli goal (2010s-2023) was to prevent a unified Palestinian state by maintaining Hamas rule in Gaza, countering the Palestinian Authority. The mechanism involved explicitly facilitating and approving Qatari financial aid, including cash transfers, to the Hamas-run government.
The outcome was that Hamas gained financial stability and administrative control, freeing up its own resources for military buildup, as indicated by Shin Bet. The consequence was that Hamas launched significant attacks, culminating in the October 7, 2023, assault. This sequence reveals a profound strategic paradox: Israel’s repeated attempts to control or shape the Palestinian political landscape through indirect means (parapolitics) have consistently resulted in strengthening the very forces that later become its most formidable and intractable adversaries. The short-term tactical gains (weakening PLO, maintaining Palestinian division) have led to severe long-term strategic liabilities (a more powerful, entrenched, and militarily capable Hamas). This is a classic “blowback” scenario, where covert policies or indirect strategic interventions outgrow their original intent and create negative consequences for the orchestrating power.
Examination of Arguments for and Against the Claim that Israel’s Actions Inadvertently or Intentionally Strengthened Hamas
Arguments supporting the claim that Israel’s actions inadvertently or intentionally strengthened Hamas are multifaceted. Historically, Israel’s direct support for Islamist groups to counter the PLO is well-documented. More recently, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s reported statement in 2019, “Anyone who wants to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state needs to support strengthening Hamas,” provides a direct indication of a strategic intent to empower Hamas for broader political goals. This aligns with former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s view that Israel “did everything to downgrade the Palestinian Authority and to boost Hamas” over the last 15 years. Furthermore, the Shin Bet probe explicitly identified Israel’s policy of facilitating Qatari funds (approved by Israel) as a factor in Hamas’s buildup. The principle of “fungibility of money” is also critical here: even if aid was ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, by covering civilian expenses, it freed up Hamas’s own resources for military or other strategic objectives. A confidential report by US and Israeli intelligence professionals in April 2024 concluded that “Qatari funding and policies led directly to October 7th, further solidifying the argument of direct impact.
Conversely, arguments against the claim emphasize humanitarian justifications. Prime Minister Netanyahu has vehemently denied intentionally boosting Hamas, calling it a “big lie.” He asserts that the Qatari money was allowed to flow into Gaza solely to avoid a “civilian humanitarian collapse—disease, rampant hunger and other things that would have created an impossible humanitarian situation.” Qatar, for its part, consistently insists that “no aid has ever been delivered to Hamas’s political or military wing,” and that all aid was provided with the “full knowledge, support, and supervision of the current and previous Israeli administrations and their security agencies—including the Shin Bet.”
The “humanitarian aid” claim serves as a convenient and internationally palatable justification for a policy that, at least from the perspective of critics and internal Israeli assessments, had deeper, more controversial strategic objectives. This creates a significant layer of strategic ambiguity where the true intent behind facilitating these funds is obscured. This ambiguity allows for both humanitarian claims and political maneuvering, leading to ongoing debate and criticism regarding the ultimate impact of the policy. The “valise full of millions” is not just about the physical transfer of money, but the complex interplay of intent, oversight, and the unintended consequences of such a policy.
Critical Evaluation of “Israeli War Rhetoric” in Light of the Presented Evidence
Israeli war rhetoric consistently emphasizes the objective of dismantling Hamas, eradicating its capabilities, and preventing its rearmament. However, historical and contemporary evidence, particularly concerning Israel’s role in initially fostering Islamist groups and later facilitating Qatari financial flows to the Hamas-run government, creates a significant and demonstrable discrepancy between the stated war aims and past policy actions.
The stated rhetoric is that Israel aims to “eradicate Hamas,” “dismantle Hamas’ regime,” and ensure the “de-militarization and de-radicalization of Gaza”. However, the historical policy (parapolitics) involved Israel actively supporting the precursor to Hamas to counter the PLO. More recently, the policy involved Israel facilitating significant Qatari funds to the Hamas-run government, with the alleged strategic goal of preventing a unified Palestinian state. The outcome of these policies was that Hamas became financially stable, consolidated control, and developed significant military capabilities, leading to major conflicts. This reveals a significant “reality gap” where the public narrative of perpetual conflict with an external, unassisted enemy contrasts sharply with a history of strategic engagement that may have exacerbated the very problem it now seeks to eliminate. This inherent contradiction lends considerable weight to the premise that “Israeli war rhetoric is far from reality, and that Israel has been protecting Hamas all along.”
Discussion of the Strategic Implications of Israel’s Approach to Hamas and Gaza
The long-term implications of Israel’s “parapolitical” approach to Hamas and Gaza are profound. This strategy, aimed at managing the Palestinian issue through division, has arguably contributed to the current intractable nature of the conflict, where Hamas has become deeply embedded, resilient, and a formidable military and political force. The consistent policy of preventing a unified, moderate Palestinian interlocutor, whether through undermining the PLO or the PA, may have inadvertently prolonged the conflict and intensified its violent manifestations. This approach, while perhaps offering short-term tactical advantages, has generated severe long-term strategic liabilities, demonstrating the inherent dangers of covert influence when it metastasizes beyond its original intent.
A Call for Moral Clarity: Reimagining Israeli Policy
This analysis has meticulously examined the complex relationship between Israeli military operations, Qatari financial aid, and the broader geopolitical dynamics involving Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah, critically assessing the assertion that “Israeli war rhetoric is far from reality, and that Israel has been protecting Hamas all along.”
We confirm that Qatari financial aid, often delivered in significant cash sums and with explicit Israeli approval, became a prominent feature of the post-conflict landscape in Gaza, particularly following Operation Protective Edge in 2014. While Qatar provided some medical aid during Operation Summer Rains (2006) and made significant pledges after Cast Lead (2008-2009) and Pillar of Defense (2012), the direct “valise of millions” delivery method is most clearly documented for the period following Protective Edge.
The “parapolitics” thesis finds strong support in the historical record, demonstrating Israel’s early cultivation of Islamic groups (the precursor to Hamas) to counter the PLO. This historical pattern evolved into the more recent policy of facilitating Qatari aid to Hamas as a strategic means to prevent a unified Palestinian state by maintaining division between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. This approach, while perhaps intended to manage the conflict, ultimately empowered Hamas, allowing it to consolidate control and divert resources for military buildup, as indicated by Israeli intelligence.
While Iran remains the primary military patron of Hamas and Hezbollah, providing direct financial and material support, Qatar’s financial support to the Hamas-led government, despite its humanitarian claims, has been criticized for its fungibility. This indirect enablement of Hamas’s administrative and operational capacity has contributed to its resilience and its ability to function within the broader Iran-led “resistance camp.” Qatar’s role as a mediator and host for Hamas leadership is distinct from Iran’s direct military support, but its financial involvement is a critical component of the regional dynamic.
Is Israeli war rhetoric far from reality, and has Israel been protecting Hamas all along? While the term “protecting” might imply direct intent to bolster Hamas’s military wing, the evidence strongly suggests that Israeli policies, both historically (parapolitics) and in the facilitation of Qatari aid, have consistently “enabled,” “facilitated,” and “strategically empowered” Hamas as a political and administrative entity. This empowerment has contributed to Hamas’s capacity to challenge Israel militarily and politically. The reality gap between rhetoric and policy is significant, as Israel’s stated war aims of dismantling Hamas often contrast with past and ongoing policies that have contributed to its entrenchment.
The case of Israel-Hamas-Qatar dynamics serves as a powerful illustration of how short-term strategic calculations, particularly those involving indirect or covert means (parapolitics), ultimately lead to complex and often detrimental long-term consequences. It underscores the inherent dangers and potential for “blowback” when employing “divide and rule” strategies in deeply rooted national conflicts.
Ultimately, the recurring cycle of conflict and consequences of short-term strategic maneuvers highlights a critical need for a deeper, more enduring framework for Israeli policy and military doctrine.
When immediate tactical gains overshadow the profound, long-term implications for regional stability and human life, the path ahead becomes fraught with peril. A more balanced and sustainable approach might be found by integrating principles derived from Torah sources.
As Divine instruction, the Torah offers moral guidelines and wisdom that provide profound balance in weighing life-and-death considerations, particularly when navigating the complex interplay between short-term exigencies and long-term societal and moral consequences.
By grounding policy in these timeless values, Israel can foster a strategic vision that prioritizes not political expediency, but the paramount sanctity of life, thereby aligning its actions with the moral purpose for which the world was created.
