In 1975, U.S. Ambassador Shirley Temple Black perfectly diagnosed the core of American foreign policy. The Soviets, she explained, play “chess,” with long-range, coordinated moves.

“By contrast,” Ambassador Black observed, “the United States is a poker player. It looks the world over, picks up whatever cards it is dealt, until the hand is won or lost. Then, after a drag on the cigarette and another sip of whiskey, it looks around for the next hand to be played.”

This “poker player” mindset—a system of “practices followed by default”—was at the heart of the U.S. failure in Afghanistan.

This was the central debate in a May, 1985 conference. Dr. Edward Luttwak defended the bureaucracy, stating, “Don’t blame the CIA employees. They are only implementing national policy.” But Angelo Codevilla, then Congress’s primary expert on covert operations, immediately contradicted him: “I am not as charitable… There is no national policy decision. Practices are followed by default.“

This policy vacuum was not just an academic debate; it had lethal consequences.

As humanitarian aid groups like Americares noted, the State Department considered Afghanistan a “low priority.” This forced private, U.S.-based aid groups to operate “independently,” without U.S. government protection.

In Chapter 5 of my book, I detail how this “policy by default” led directly to the first American blood drawn in the war. On September 25, 1985, Arizona Republic reporter Charles Thornton was traveling with one of these independent medical teams when he was killed by a Soviet mine.

The full chapter—which includes the “smoking gun” letter from the aid group and the CIA’s 12-for-12 failure rate in supporting resistance movements—is now live on my Substack.

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