After an Arab worker was recorded contaminating ice cream for Jewish customers, I commented that I always wondered about the people who run to bomb shelters, yet have no problem eating in restaurants with Arabs working there.

A reader commented, “Tell me to which population you generalize when a, or some, member(s) of its ranks violate(s) your trust, and I’ll tell you where your prejudices lie.”

My answer follows:

Let us start with the interview with Tzvi Yechezkeli, who describes encounters where Arabs emphasized that Islamic doctrine supersedes personal relationships or secular agreements, viewing concessions or alliances with non-Muslims (particularly Jews) as temporary tactics rather than genuine commitments.

Aristotle’s Law of Identity (A is A) is foundational to logic, asserting that a thing is what it is and cannot be otherwise without contradiction. In Metaphysics (Book IV), he articulates it as: “The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.” This is not just abstract; it underpins rational judgment by demanding we recognize entities as they empirically present themselves, without distortion.

(Since Aristotle learned from Plato, and Plato learned from Yirmiyahu HaNavi, it is not difficult to identify the Torah source paralleling Aristotle’s Law of Identity: In Exodus 3:14, the Creator identifies Himself as “Ekyeh asher Ekyeh” (often translated as “I am that I am” or “I will be what I will be”), an assertion of absolute, self-sufficient existence—where G-d’s essence is identical to His being, unchanging and without contradiction. This is mirrored in Aristotle’s law, who affirms necessary identity in his Metaphysics, where the Unmoved Mover’s essence equals His existence.)

Applying this to cultural or group identities means acknowledging observable patterns without erasure. If Yechezkeli’s analysis—based on his undercover experiences—portrays Arab and Islamic culture as inherently viewing peace overtures as exploitable weaknesses, then to judge individuals from that culture “favorably” in a way that ignores these tendencies is to say “A is not A.” It represents a denial of identity: treating an Arab not as embodying the cultural norms Yechezkeli documents, but as a blank slate amenable to Western/Jewish values of reciprocity. This is a logical fallacy, akin to what philosophers called “evasion”—refusing to integrate facts into one’s worldview.

In a previous article, I related to this when I wrote:

“Jewish law, or halacha, offers a clear corrective to this misguided inversion. The mitzvah of dan l’kaf zchut—the obligation to judge others favorably—is a cornerstone of our tradition.

“However, it is not a universal mandate applied to all of humanity; its context is rooted in ahavat Yisrael, the love for one’s fellow Jew. For a coreligionist whose actions appear questionable, we are commanded to assume the best, to seek out merit, and to understand that exceptions refine our view of communal responsibility without negating it.

“Conversely, halacha imposes no such obligation toward members of a hostile nation during a time of war. The Talmud permits, and even encourages, suspicion for the sake of self-preservation. Maimonides, in his laws of kings, outlines the conduct of war without any requirement for naive charity toward one’s enemies.

“In Israel’s ongoing existential struggle, the principle of pikuach nefesh, the preservation of human life, overrides all other considerations. Making security assessments based on general patterns is not malice; it is prudence. Vetted Arab allies, collaborators, and loyal citizens may be exceptions that clarify our boundaries, but they do not disprove the rule of vigilance.

“To insist on judging a population that largely supports our destruction favorably is to risk Israeli lives, defying the very ethics that have sustained our people for generations.”

And in another article:

“The inevitable outcome of this philosophy is the very situation the commenter I’m responding to decries: a vague, demagogic approach to reality. When you can not tell the difference between a Christian and a Muslim, a citizen and a non-citizen, or a friend and an enemy, you are indeed in trouble. But this confusion is not the cause of our problems; it is the symptom. It is the end stage of a philosophical disease. It is the direct result of abandoning the one system that provides the ultimate tool for making distinctions: the Torah.”

Dan l’kaf zchut (judging favorably) is not a blanket obligation but contextually bound, particularly tied to ahavat Yisrael (love for fellow Jews). The Mishnah in Pirkei Avot (1:6) states: “Judge every person favorably,” but commentators like the Rambam (Maimonides) in his Commentary on the Mishnah clarify it is primarily for one’s community or those presumed righteous, not a naive mandate for all. The Gemara (Shabbat 127a) expands this as giving the benefit of the doubt when actions are ambiguous, but not when patterns suggest malice.

Crucially, this mitzvah does not extend universally to non-Jews or enemies, especially in wartime. Shevuot 30a discusses suspicion toward potential threats for self-preservation, without requiring favorable judgment if it endangers lives. Rambam, in Hilchot Melachim u’Milchamot 6:1 outlines war conduct: Offer peace first, but if rejected, proceed without “naive charity” toward enemies, allowing preemptive actions if there is fear of attack. He distinguishes obligatory wars (e.g., defensive against aggressors) from discretionary ones, emphasizing no obligation to assume benevolence from hostile nations. In the Jewish People’s existential struggle, suspicion is not malice but prudence.

Pikuach nefesh (preservation of life) overrides nearly all mitzvot except idolatry, murder, and forbidden sexual relations. As the Rambam says in Hilchot Shabbat (2:3), even a slight doubt of danger permits violating Shabbat. Thus, if general patterns in a population (e.g., polls showing widespread support for anti-Israel actions) indicate risk, favorable judgments defy pikuach nefesh, prioritizing abstract, synthetic morality over survival. Exceptions like loyal Arab citizens “clarify boundaries” without disproving the rule—much like Aristotle’s equity tempers identity without negating it.